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Ernest Gellner (1983) considered that, like nations, ethnic groups were ‘invented’. 
The analogy is all the more accurate in that the nation-state model, at least in the 
form it had in nineteenth-century European nationalisms, is the main model pursued 
by most ethnic politicians. They regard ethnic groups as true nations not only in their 
nature – homogeneous, specific, and immutable communities – but also in the rights 
they should be entitled to – an exclusive territory and political sovereignty over it. 
Nevertheless, the most recent history shows such fictions often becoming realities, in 
the form of identities that ordinary people sincerely assume for themselves. So, if 
ethnic groups are invented, or at least ‘re-invented’, two questions emerge: firstly, out 
of what original elements and by what processes are they shaped? And secondly: 
how did the social identities look before that, what type of communities did people 
feel that they then belonged to?
In an article written for the fiftieth anniversary of Political Systems of Highland 
Burma, I insisted on the diversity of identity models, taking the example of three cases 
from Northeast India.1 I suggested that to understand anything about the 
mechanisms of identity in this particular area, one had to admit the dissociation 
between social structures, cultural patterns, and cultural practices, thus going beyond 
the confusion that contemporary identity discourses obviously entertained between 
these three levels. I will follow in this direction here, both in providing more examples 
illustrating the diversity of identities in the Northeast and also in testing the 
usefulness of the concept of ‘belonging’ in this respect. 
I won’t abandon the notion of ‘identity’. Despite its obvious overuses it is 
absolutely needed to account for realities that cannot be easily looked upon as mere 
1  Ramirez 2007.
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instrumental discourses. I feel all the more easy with the concept of identity, i.e. 
social identity, in that I reject all its essentialist assumptions. Identity is obviously a 
matter of perception, representation, and discourse, and it is by nature subjective: 
identity is not the ‘true nature’ of social groups, it is definitely the assertion by series 
of individuals that they form such or such a community. Now the representations 
shaping social identities rely on the perception of – true or seemingly – cultural 
similarities and the sharing of certain spaces, institutions, and practices. It is these 
perceived affinities that may be termed ‘belongings’. Barth was absolutely right in 
asserting that identity is ‘constructed’; but such a construction relies heavily on a pre-
existing social – and natural – framework. Now if the identity processes are relatively 
flexible, this is not the case with the spaces, cultures, social structures, and 
institutions the concept refers to. One of our main objects here will be to illustrate 
several atypical local cases where dominant ethnicities stumble on inherited 
belongings. 
Ethnicities versus Cultural Complexity: The Bhoi Region
To analyse the relationships between identity and belonging in the Northeast, I 
suggest, rather than starting from particular ‘ethnic groups’, considering a particular 
area. We will look at a belt of low hills (<700m) spanning the area between the 
Meghalaya plateau and the Brahmaputra plains and corresponding  roughly to Ri-
Bhoi District, State of Meghalaya. This area is close to both Guwahati and Shillong, 
two major administrative, economic, and university centres. However, it has the 
reputation of being ‘interior’ and ‘remote’, and its anthropology is very poorly known. 
As a rough introduction, we could tell how this part of Northeast India is very 
commonly depicted: Eastern Meghalaya would be the home of the Khasi Jaintia, 
speaking Mon-Khmer languages and following ‘matrilineality’. Karbi-Anglong, more 
towards the east, would be the country of the Karbi, whose language is Tibeto-
Burmese and who are patrilinear. This simple ethno-linguistic picture corresponds in 
fact to the dominant one, resulting from a kind of compromise between the views 
promoted by the ethnic elites of the most populous groups. The ‘ethnic lands’ picture 
suggests that clear-cut boundaries exist among those groups. We will see that this is 
true neither of cultural divisions, nor of social structures, nor of ethnic divisions. To 
say the least, this part of Northeast India is a complex one. To describe it as 
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‘multiethnic’ would not be wrong at a very broad level, but much more hazardous 
when trying to qualify the local situations: as we will see below, many villages cannot 
be accurately said to be either ‘mono-ethnic’ or ‘multi-ethnic’, because their 
inhabitants do not seem to perceive themselves in ethnic terms. In other villages, 
ethnic identities obviously exist; but they do not always match with specific cultures or 
social organizations. And finally, whether this is a cause or a consequence of ethnic 
complexity, the matrimonial, political, and ritual relationships among communities 
bearing different identities are multifarious.
Fig. 4.1 Approximate location of the Bhoi area in Northeast India
In his classical monograph on the Khasi, P.R.T. Gurdon mentioned in several 
instances the ‘Bhoi’, on whom he gave indications that sounded contradictory. 2 Some 
of them were entirely wrong as we know today; however Gurdon’s confusion gives a 
clue to the complexity of the overlappings between languages, cultures, and labels. 
Thus, he asserted in his very first pages that the term ‘Bhoi’ is ‘a territorial name 
2  Gurdon 1990[1906].
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rather than tribal’. 3 Soon afterwards, describing the general setting, he mentioned the 
‘Bhoi-Khasi’ as one of the ‘five Khasi groups’ (Khasi, Synteng or Pnar, Wàr, Bhoi, 
and Lynngam) and added that the ‘Bhoi’ of Jinthong, Mynri, and Ryngkhong 
subdivisions were not Khasi, but Mikir. In modern terms, Bhoi would thus designate a 
geographical area inhabited by a ‘multiethnic’ population, including Mikir and Bhoi-
Khasi. 
Nevertheless, in other instances, Gurdon describes Bhoi as corresponding to 
a specific culture: houses built on high posts, a taboo on the use of the sickle – they 
harvested by hand – and retention of the sleeveless coats that their neighbours had 
abandoned.4 Moreover, if Bhoi-Khasi were Khasi in one way or another, they were 
also discriminated against by other Khasi . According to Gurdon, the Khasi of the 
central plateau considered it disgraceful to marry Bhoi, as did the War, the people 
from the southern ridges.5 Last but not least, the Bhoi’s inheritance law was paternal.6 
We will see that on this last point, Gurdon was wrong. Nevertheless, his description 
may be taken as a kind of hypothesis on the situation of Bhoi at the beginning of 
twentieth century: Bhoi was an area inhabited by people who differed in their 
languages but shared similarities in other cultural aspects, and whose main 
ethnolinguistic designations were Khasi (or Bhoi-Khasi) and Mikir.
Very few consistent data are available prior to Gurdon. In the Assamese 
chronicles, the buranji, only two terms are found concerning the people of this 
particular area in the eighteenth century: Dāṁtiyalīyā, and, in several instances, Gāro. ‘Dāṁtiyalīyā’ means literally ‘people of the border/limits/margins’. As for the Garo, if they are found in significant numbers in the plains bene! tiyalīyā7, and, in several instances, 
Gāro.8 ‘Dāṁtiyalīyā, and, in several instances, Gāro. ‘Dāṁtiyalīyā’ means literally ‘people of the border/limits/margins’. As for the Garo, if they are found in significant numbers in the plains bene! tiyalīyā’ means literally ‘people of the border/limits/margins’. As for the Garo, 
if they are found in significant numbers in the plains beneath Ri-Bhoi, they are absent 
today in Eastern Meghalaya, and are not mentioned in the colonial reports concerning 
3  Ibid., p. 4.
4  Ibid., p. 40.
5  Ibid., p. 62.
6  Ibid., p. 85; “... thereby supplying another link in the chain of evidence in support of the conclusion 
that the Bhois, or, more correctly speaking, the Mikirs, are of Bodo origin, and not Khasi or Mon-
Anam”.
7  Bhuyan 1932: 221–56.
8  Bhuyan 1933: 194–5; Jantiya buranji quoted by Shadap Sen 1981: 136–9.
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the end of the nineteenth century; the Garo hills (Western Meghalaya) are located far 
from there, at three days’ walking distance.9 Garo do not call themselves ‘Garo’, but 
‘Achik’. It may well be that the Assamese indistinctly called all hill-dwellers from the 
south, ‘Garo’, a term that may have some link with the term ‘Karew’ used by Khasi-
speaking Bhoi to designate themselves. Thus comparisons between eighteenth-
century data and Gurdon’s own data are uneasy. This is also true for other parts of 
the Northeast: buranji generally give very few clues on the human groups 
themselves; territories were not identified by their inhabitants but by their chiefs. Is 
this a sign of the absence of social identities in the past? Of the lack of collective 
consciousnesses that would have resulted in something alike ‘ethnicities’? At least 
one has to underline the scarcity of collective terms in the pre-British documents.
What do we know about the present anthropology of the Bhoi region? Its 
administrative setting has to be introduced first, because, as we will see, it has now a 
very perceptible effect on the senses of belonging. The former Bhoi country more or 
less corresponds to Ri-Bhoi district, founded in 1992 within Meghalaya State. It falls 
under the Khasi Hills Autonomous District, assigned to the Khasi-Jaintia scheduled 
tribe according to the 6th schedule of the Indian Constitution (1951), which covers the 
central third of Meghalaya.10 In Meghalaya, the former political institutions, which 
already had relative autonomy in colonial times, are legally recognized and have a 
say in law-making and administration. Ri-Bhoi is thus dependent upon two major 
Khasi rulers, the syiems of Khyrim and Mylliem, whose seats are outside Ri-Bhoi and 
who preside over local chiefs with various statuses (syiem, sirdar, lyngdoh). We will 
see below that the languages as well as many cultural patterns found in Ri-Bhoi are 
also found across its eastern border with the Jaintia Hills district (Meghalaya) and the 
Hamren subdivision of Karbi-Anglong (Assam). These cover the former Jaintia 
kingdom's possessions, ‘fully’ annexed by the British as early as 1836 (Fig. 4.2).
9  The 1931 Census showed a total of about 7,000 Garo in the “Khasi & Jaintia Hills”, but the figures 
didn't distinguish between the hills themselves and the portions of plains included in the K&J Hills 
(Census of India 1931).
10 The original United Khasi–Jaintia Autonomous District (1952) was divided into two Autonomous 
Districts (Khasi and Jaintia) in 1963.
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Fig. 4.2 Administrative divisions in the Ri-Bhoi/Karbi-Anglong area.
The official ethnic profiles only take into account the ‘scheduled tribes’ in the 
strict sense, i.e. only those who have this status in the state for which the data are 
given. For Ri-Bhoi District, 2001, the figures are: Khasi-Jaintia 139,071; Mikir 10,523; 
Garo 9,376.11 I haven’t yet obtained the linguistic figures at the district level. 
However, out of the disparate pieces of information I possess, a very complex 
situation emerges, and one that diverges quite notably from the official figures. 
The Khasi speakers of Bhoi generally call themselves ‘Karew’, 12 and use the 
term ‘Bhoi’ to designate the other dwellers of the area collectively: the Karbi speakers 
(whom they specifically call ‘Mikir’) and the Tiwa speakers (‘Lalung’).13 All three 
groups are called ‘Bhoi’ by the Khasi speakers from other areas. It seems, however, 
that the semantic field of ‘Bhoi’ is changing nowadays, maybe as an effect of the 
implementation of the new Ri-Bhoi district: the Confederation of Ri-Bhoi People now 
11 Census of India 2001.
12 Karmawphlang (2001: 53): “Karew are the Khasis who live on the Northern slopes of the Khasi hills.”
13 ‘Mikir’ and ‘Lalung’ were extensively used in Assam till twenty years ago. Although they remain in 
the State’s official Scheduled Tribes’ list, they have now been replaced in common usage by the 
indigenous “Karbi” and “Tiwa” promoted by the tribal associations.
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claims ‘Bhoi’ as their legitimate ethnic label, against the will of some all-Khasi 
organizations.14
Territorial Belonging and Identity: The Marnga Case
I propose to give a few cases that exemplify the various overlappings between 
culture, identity, and belonging in the Bhoi area. We will proceed from west to east. 
Less than three kilometres from the Guwahati–Shillong National Highway, the 
Marnga (or Marngar) have the reputation of forming an atypical tribe, at least in the 
eyes of those who know about their existence, i.e. their closest neighbours and a few 
knowledgeable persons in Shillong. Because for others, as it is for the Census, the 
area is ‘fully Khasi’, the Marnga describe themselves as the people of ‘Nine Villages’ 
that formed the core of an autonomous principality ruled by a rājā (or syiem, the two 
terms being used indistinctly). Looking at the electoral data, the population of the 
Nine Villages might be estimated at about 2,000 people, excluding four villages that 
the Marnga consider as ‘Khasi’. 15 Marnga assume themselves to be ‘Bhoi’, and more 
particularly one of the three Bhoi subgroups, which they list as: Bhoi Marnga, Bhoi 
Karo and Bhoi Marvet, each corresponding to a particular area.16
Marnga express their specificity through a number of cultural features. The 
most striking would be their language. Yet the Marnga language proves to be very 
close to Assamese, the major Indo-Aryan language in neighbouring Assam. The 
difference is that Marnga use a few dozen Tibeto-Burman-looking words, which till 
14 Shillong Times 19 October 2004: “The Confederation of Ri-Bhoi People (CORP) in a statement 
issued here has strongly defended the use of ‘Ri-Bhoi’ nomenclature for Ri-Bhoi district. Stating that 
the nomenclature was not only started since creation of Ri-Bhoi district, the organisation said that it 
was a name given to the people of the area since time immemorial.The organisation also said that 
the State Government should first change the name of Meghalaya ‘which was not an indigenous 
name for our land’. It may be mentioned that the Ri-Bhoi Youth Federation (RBYF) was the first 
organisation to oppose the changing of Ri-Bhoi district into ‘North Khasi Hills District’. Further, the 
KSU had issued statement stating that the use of ‘Ri-Bhoi’ nomenclature should be removed in order 
to preserve the unity of Khasi tribes. KSU and FKJGP were the only organisations to have used Ri-
Bhoi district as ‘North Khasi Hills District’.” [FKJGP : Federation of Khasi, Jaintia, and Garo Peoples]
15 Electoral Rolls 2006, A100016-18.
16 Bhoi Marvet would be the hills immediately above Guwahati, Bhoi Karo the remaining of the Bhoi 
area. ‘Karo’ corresponds most probably to ‘Karew’.
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now could not be related to any neighbouring Tibeto-Burman languages.17 Beside, 
Khasi is spoken by every Marnga. If the Marnga language is peculiar it is indeed as 
an island of Indo-Aryan language at the core of a Khasi linguistic area. The Marnga 
say they belong to eleven clans. In fact, two clan names only can be said to be 
specific to the Nine Villages: Binong – the oldest clan in Marnga – and Barka. Three 
others are found mainly in the west of Ri-Bhoi district, among groups that we assume 
are Khasi-speaking. The remaining six are common in the whole Khasi linguistic 
area, among them the Syiem clan from which the Marnga chiefs are recruited.18 In 
terms of descent systems, the Marnga both resemble the neighbouring societies in 
their ‘traditional’ matrilineality19 and differ in its present development: matrilineality is 
highly prevalent among the older generations, but patrilineality is a clear tendency 
nowadays. Interestingly, one of our informants explained that this new trend was 
resisted by Marnga society on ‘moral grounds’, but that it was needed, owing to the 
prevalence of patrilineality in Assam. It has to be noted that the neighbouring Khasi-
speaking communities are still largely matrilineal, that descent in the female line has 
legal status in Meghalaya, that it is an emblematic institution of the Khasi identity, 
and that it represents a common process for adopting outsiders. The prevalence of 
Christianity (79 per cent in Ri-Bhoi, 70 per cent in Meghalaya) does not seem to have 
significantly affected the descent system.20
The Nine Villages and their syiem are placed under the syiem of Mylliem. We 
may guess that this situation goes back to at least the nineteenth century, because 
there is no trace of other syiems or of any Assamese chief in this area during the 
colonial period. In Khasi language, the Marnga rājā is known as Syiem Raid Marngar 
(King of the Marnga district); his status is that of a syiem raid, a subordinate syiem – 
17 According to François Jacquesson, CNRS LACITO, a specialist in Tibeto-Burman languages, who 
visited Marnga with me in March 2007.
18 Data on the clan distribution come from an analysis of Indian electoral lists undertaken under the 
ANR project “Languages, Cultures and Territories in Northeast India”; see 
http://www.vjf.cnrs.fr/brahmaputra/uk/corpora/people.htm.
19 Matrilineality is taken here in the wider sense: adoption of the mother’s clan, matrilocality, and 
inheritance in the female line.
20 Census of India 2001.
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raid being the lower administrative unit above the village. His authority is exerted 
more on a spatial area than on a particular community, because it concerns the four 
Khasi villages of Marnga as well. Under a contract with Mylliem, he collects a tax on 
the Mawlong market.21 
Finally, the scanty data that we have on Marnga religion indicate that, 
depending whether it is calendar, practices, charges or beliefs that are considered, 
its patterns may look more Assamese, Khasi, or specific.
In the Marnga case, the asserted identity (‘We are Marnga’) thus corresponds 
above all to a territorial and politico-historical belonging: ‘Nine villages’ under their 
own chief. Clan belonging does not seem to be a criterion of differentiation, as most 
Marnga clan names are found among the ‘Khasi’. In the same way, Marnga do not 
describe themselves as being people of the ‘Eleven clans’. This is a critical difference 
compared with other communities in the region, like the Karbi, who define 
themselves as being members of five particular clans. Similarly, cultural differences 
are hardly put forward by the Margna in their identity statements: to take only two 
fundamental aspects, their language is noticeable only as an Assamese isolate within 
a Khasi-speaking area; and matrilineality is widespread all over the region. If Marnga 
cultural specificity is a reality it resides in a unique combination of discrete terms that 
also exist among their neighbours. It is nevertheless remarkable that Marnga identity 
survives when other more culturally specific groups are content with a ‘Khasi only’ 
identity. In other words, the cultural proximity of the Marnga with the Khasi, their 
sharing of similar clan names, their acceptance of a Khasi syiem, their situation at the 
core of the Khasi-speaking area, and finally their Khasi ST status does not seem to 
weigh much on their perception of their identity, or at least on its assertion. It is 
possible that the maintenance of a distinct chief, whatever the reality of his power, 
plays a crucial role in this regard. In the course of this chapter, we will find other 
illustrations of the importance of traditional political belongings in the shaping of 
identities.
21 In the absence of land taxes, market taxes constitute the main bulk of the revenue of Khasi chiefs.
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Rising Ethnicities : Marmyeng
The second case pertains to Marmyeng, a group of villages about fifteen kilometres 
to the east of Marnga. The data discussed here have been locally collected from 
members of the ‘All Meghalaya Karbi Association’. I was accompanied by Karbi 
colleagues originating from Karbi Anglong District. To introduce briefly the 
relationships between culture and identity among the Karbi, we may say that half the 
communities claiming a Karbi identity live in the hills (Karbi-Anglong and Meghalaya) 
and the other half in the plains, where their villages are scattered over a vast area to 
the south of the Brahmaputra, from Guwahati to Upper Assam.22 Their speeches are 
mutually comprehensible, although relatively differentiated, especially between the 
plains and the hills, but also within the hills. Moreover, Karbi areas differ remarkably 
in their politico-ritual systems: either a regional and pyramidal apparatus, or village 
autonomies.23 Nevertheless, the status of Karbi everywhere implies belonging to one 
of five clans: Teron, Terang, Ingthi, Inghi, or Timung.
Marmyeng is said to include eight villages in Meghalaya and two in Assam. Its 
Meghalaya population can be estimated at around 2,000 people. The Karbi speakers 
we met in Marmyeng asserted their Karbi identity by putting forward not only their 
dialect, which displays few differences from those of Karbi-Anglong, but first of all 
their patronyms. Half the Marmyeng Karbi have been converted to Christianity, which 
is relatively fewer than the Meghalaya average. The non-Christian ritual calendar 
comprises rites typical of Assamese Hinduism (Domahi/Bihu, Huriya), together with 
rites more common in the hills and in Southeast Asia, such as ‘closing the village’ 
during the eviction of malevolent spirits, locally called Rong Ke Um.24 There is no 
trace here of the major ritual events among the Karbi of the hills (Chojun, 
Chomangkhang, Rongkher) nor of the plains (Dehal, Jahang).
Marmyeng is administered by a hereditary rongthe assisted by officeholders, 
each from a particular lineage. Although the designations of positions are partly 
22 For descriptions of the present Karbi, see Bhattacharjee (1986) and Phangcho et al. (2008).
23 On the variation of political systems and rituals among the Karbi, see Ramirez (2007: 99–102).
24 A.W. Macdonald, "Notes sur la claustration villageoise dans l'Asie du Sud-Est", Journal Asiatique 
Tome CCXLV, Année 1957, n° 2. In the Northeast, closing the village is especially common among 
the Dimasa (Danda 1978: 132–3).
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Assamese, their functions bear several similarities to those of the political system of 
Western Karbi Anglong, which is reputed to represent the ‘traditional’ Karbi political 
apparatus. At a higher level, Marmyeng is presently subordinated to the Mylliem 
syiem. This is a relatively new situation, as before 1830 it was dependent on Dimoria, 
in Assam, a principality whose present rājās consider themselves as Karbi and still 
acknowledge the Marmyeng bangthe as their feudatory. Incidentally the links with 
Mylliem have faded. Mylliem sovereignty over Marmyeng is still valid in the eyes of 
the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council. A few years ago the Mylliem syiem kept 
coming to levy taxes. Marmyeng people use to visit his residence, near Shillong, 
either to settle disputes or to bring a goat to the annual Ningkrem, the main Khasi 
collective rite. According to our informants, these relationships have come to an end. 
Thus, in Marmyeng’s current politico-ritual practices, the signs of an older 
authority are preserved at the expense of those of a newer one, providing an 
example of the weight of ethnicity on belongings. The fact that the Dimoria chiefs are 
considered by Marmyeng people as Karbi undoubtedly plays a role in such an 
apparent anachronism. Thus, in Marmyeng, Karbi speakers seem to be split between 
several territorial belongings. ‘Attachment’ would be more correct to qualify the 
feeling of Marmyeng Karbi towards Dimoria, and moreover towards Karbi-Anglong: 
they do not belong to that district, but feel a certain attraction towards a place that 
can be considered as ‘Karbiland’. Marmyeng being a Karbi enclave within a Khasi-
dominated territory, it is particularly responsive to the Karbi ethnic programme in its 
ambition of re-uniting all the scattered Karbi components. Dimoria kingdom exerts a 
kind of challenging seduction: despite its modest size and power, it possesses a 
higher historical relevance, and indeed represents a more local ‘Karbi’ dominion. 
Finally, the location of Marmyeng within Meghalaya territory implies a de facto political 
belonging. This is not radically rejected the way a pro-independence discourse would 
reject it; but it is clearly underplayed. Neglect for the Khasi syiem is one sign, another 
being claims to autochthony: ‘We were the original inhabitants of Ri-Bhoi, before the 
Khasi themselves.’ This attitude has to be contrasted with that of Marnga, where a 
specific identity and the acknowledgement of a local chief (Syiem Marnga) does not 
preclude the acceptance of an overarching Khasi sovereignty (Syiem Mylliem). In 
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Meghalaya, Karbi is recognized as a Scheduled Tribe, under the label Mikir (11,399 
in 2001),25 and most Marmyeng inhabitants hold this status. This does not prevent 
them feeling that the Karbi of Meghalaya are discriminated against by the Khasi 
majority, a sentiment that we have not noticed in Marnga, and which points to a 
different kind of identity. Marnga people, who are still more of a minority and are not 
recognized as a separate entity, assume their Khasi ethnicity beyond their specific 
Marnga ethnicity. In other words, they accept the possibility of inserted ethnic 
belongings.
It is very uncertain how old the Marmyeng Karbi identity is in its present form. 
Interestingly, our informants themselves pointed out that there exist, in their 
immediate vicinity, some groups with a looser identity: this is the case with the small 
village of Markang, in the North of Marmyeng on the Assam–Meghalaya border, 
which consists of a dozen houses bearing Karbi clan names. We were told that 
Markang was founded some ten years ago by people who came from Marnga. At 
first, they did not consider themselves either as Karbi or as Khasi, but were more at 
ease with the Khasi language than with Karbi, which they still speak with difficulty. 
They were enticed by the Karbi speakers of Marmyeng to ‘convert’ into Karbi. This 
practice is quite common among the Karbi, where a newcomer is purified and 
adopted into a Karbi clan. 26 Markang people are still perceived as a marginal group, 
badly integrated, unsure about their belonging and whose practices would differ from 
those of the ‘typical’ Karbi culture. 
Promotion of Karbi conversion would arise in reaction to an opposite 
movement of a greater dimension. According to our informants, among the 60,000 
‘real Karbi’ living in 51 villages of Meghalaya, 20,000 have ‘converted’ to Khasi and 
become matrilineal – which goes some way towards accounting for the fact that only 
11,400 are listed in the Census. However, their Khasi-ization would not be complete: 
“They introduce themselves as Khasi in front of Khasi and Karbi when meeting 
25 www.censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_st_meghalaya.pdf
26 We have discovered a similar and very recent case in the vicinity of Guwahati, where a whole Garo 
village was converted into Karbi under the pretext that its inhabitants had some difficulties finding 
matrimonial matches.
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Karbi.” And their clan names still prove they are Karbi. So here is the logic: a clan 
name with a Karbi consonance does attest a Karbi origin. As a matter of fact, 
similarity between patronyms is not always obvious – at least for an outsider – and 
may require some interpretation. One readily suspects that not all Khasi  perceive 
these homonymies – paronymies, in fact – in the same way. They may have a 
different view altogether, stating that these names are “purely Khasi” and that those 
who bear them in Meghalaya are without doubt Khasi. Out of the state, ‘Khasi names’ 
among Karbi people would indicate a ‘conversion’ from Khasi to Karbi. 
All these assertions do not tell how the maintenance of a patronym is actually 
possible, considering the difference of descent rules between Karbi and Khasi: when 
shifting from a patrineal to a matrilineal society, or the opposite, the name of the 
convert/spouse should disappear at the next generation. But this may not be a crucial 
point here, because we are not primarily concerned with discourses: rather, such 
divergent interpretations should lead to an examination of the role that clanic 
belonging plays in the emergence of ascribed or self-ascribed ethnic categorizations. 
Firstly, because in the identity discourses heard in this region, clanic belonging 
seems to matter much more than language, descent, dress, or any other visible sign. 
Bearing a certain clan name means belonging to the corresponding clan and thus, 
systematically, to the ethnic group to which this clan is exclusive – in the eyes of the 
speaker. Then, if there is a disagreement on paronymous clan names, it is precisely 
because they are found among different areas and cultures. This is quite a 
widespread phenomenon, which in the context of rising ethnic claims becomes one 
of the leitmotifs of identity assertions. 27
Non-ethnic Communities at the Borders: The Mawker Case
The case of Markang, the ‘poorly converted’ village, is not exceptional in the region. 
Several villages are locally known for their uncertain identities. No fieldwork has yet 
been done on these communities, but it may be noticed that they are located at the 
margins of what could be called ‘ethnic cores’. By ethnic cores I mean spaces 
27 Trans-ethnic clans and clan names were documented as early as 1917 by Barbeau (1917: 393) in 
North America. For more recent examples in Africa see for instance Schlee 1985 or Lindgren 2004 
(178, 182–7).
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qualified by a homogeneity in terms of both culture and identity, which does not 
exclude the possibility that they contain several linguistic or ethnic components.28 
Marmyeng is a small-sized example. The territory of the Hill Tiwa, twenty kilometres 
to the east, is a more salient case.29 Commonly referred to by the name of one of its 
larger villages, ‘Umswai’, this area comprises a concentration of villages speaking 
Tiwa, a Tibeto-Burmese language of the Bodo-Garo group, the largest group of 
whose inhabitants claim in their majority to be ‘Tiwa’. They, however, form only one-
third of a total population of 30,000, which also includes Karbi, Khasi, and Nepali 
villages. Villages are almost always mono-ethnic, even in the common case where 
they are a few hundred metres apart from each other. In the Umswai area, the 
identity of each village is explicit. This does not mean that it is absolutely perennial. 
Within the last thirty years, abundant conversions to Christianity as well as the 
establishment of new villages by Christians seem to have been associated with shifts 
from the one identity to the other.30
Nevertheless, almost everybody in the area explicitly asserts his belonging to 
an ethnic group – or ‘tribe’, to render the exact term used – whether Tiwa, Karbi, 
Khasi, or Nepali. And the first justification given to one’s own ethnic belonging as well 
as others’ is almost always the patronym, which points to a clan and thus to an 
assumed ethnicity.31 
28 The opposition between ethnic cores and margins that I draw here is mainly for qualifying different 
levels of convergence between culture and identity; I do not refer to any opposition – which may 
nevertheless exist – between a “centre” and a “periphery”, and more precisely not to the models 
imagined by Mus or Tambiah, which have recently been assessed by Toffin (2007: 14–18) in 
connection with the peripheral groups of the Kathmandu Valley.
29 We will only speak here about the Hill Tiwa, who differ from the Plains Tiwa in their culture and 
language but not in their identity.
30 Why many Christians have left their original villages is not yet very clear, although there are signs of 
reactions against conversions to Christianity, whether or not these are devised by Hindu radical 
movements. A proportion of non-Christian claim they are “Hindus”. If the tribal religions in the 
Northeast have been in varying degrees influenced by Hinduism, the religion of the Hills Tiwa is 
nevertheless clearly distinct from Assamese or Bengali Hinduism, even taking into account the 
variability of these.
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At the periphery of Umswai area, identities are less clear-cut. Many villagers of 
the foothills annually attend Jonbil Mela, a fair held near Jagiroad in Assam. In 
February 2007, with a couple of Tiwa friends, I questioned visitors about their 
geographical origin, their mother tongue and – in a rather naive manner – about the 
ethnic group to which they belonged. A family who came from Mawker, one day’s 
walk from there, in Meghalaya, responded very briefly by saying they spoke Karbi 
and Khasi. After my Tiwa friends summoned them to state whether they where Karbi, 
Khasi, or Tiwa, they just answered: “We are from kur Mukti.” In Khasi language, kur 
means a clan. Mukti, generally spelled ‘Muktieh’ in Meghalaya, is quite a common 
title in Ri-Bhoi, perceived as being a ‘Khasi surname’; some Tiwa interpret it instead 
as a distortion of the clan name ‘Mithi’. The fact that some Khasi-speakers living in 
Meghalaya and bearing a patronym reputed in this state as Khasi, do not introduce 
themselves as Khasi, should attract our attention.32 
Mawker is situated in the northeastern corner of Ri-Bhoi, an area facing 
Umswai on the other side of the Umiam river, which forms the boundary with Assam. 
At the time when Meghalaya was created, these villages were included in the new 
state, as they used to pay allegiance to the Khasi syiem of Khyrim. The present syiem 
of Khyrim described this region to me as being inhabited by Karbi and Lalung (Tiwa) 
having their own traditions, benefiting from his protection, and acknowledging his 
own legitimacy, notably by bringing animals at the annual Ka Ponblang sacrifice held 
in his Smit durbar near Shillong.33 Linguistically, Northeastern Ri-Bhoi displays the 
same features as Umswai: Khasi, Karbi, and Tiwa (most Nepali have fled on the 
31 The case of Nepalis is slightly different, as their names do not always refer to clans. However, 
except in some instances (like “Sharma”), they are specific enough (Chetri, Gurung, Limbu ...) to 
mean “Nepali” in ethnic terms.
32 At least, this goes against a common assumption in the region according to which the benefits of the 
Khasi status in Meghalaya incite many outsiders to marry Khasi girls in order to ‘become Khasi’.
33 According to the Khasi Autonomous Council, non-Khasi may be considered as citizens of a Khasi 
State, under the status of raiot, if they belong to “Garo or Rabha or Mikir or Hajong or Lalungs or 
Lushai (Mizo) Community or any other plain Tribal or Tribal Community (except the Dkhars)” – 
‘Dkhar’ meaning ‘non-tribal’, i.e. Assamese, Bengali, or Nepali. These communities are said to have 
been brought under the authority of the Khasi chiefs by virtue of defeat, migrations, or ‘ethnic affinity’. 
Cf. the various statuses of citizenships at http://khadc.nic.in/snippets/meanings.htm
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other side of the border after the 1987 anti-foreigners movements in Meghalaya), and 
many similar patronyms are found on both sides of the border. Thus, one would 
expect to find the same ethnic pattern as well. But this is far from being the case: 
linguistic and patronymic composition of villages is far more heterogeneous on the 
Ri-Bhoi side. The Karbi and Tiwa of Karbi-Anglong perceive many of those villages 
as either ‘truly Karbi’ or ‘truly Tiwa’, but as subjected to acculturation and not daring 
to assert their identity in a Khasi-dominated context. In certain cases, there are good 
clues enough to confirm this. For instance, in Magro and Lymphoid villages, people 
display patronyms that are widespread in Umswai Tiwa-speaking villages, but not in 
Khasi-speaking areas elsewhere in Meghalaya. Furthermore, Magro and Lymphoid 
still form two of the seven centres around which the major territorial ritual of the Tiwa-
speaking area is organized (Yangli).34 
However, other villages are obviously in a different situation, of which Mawker  
precisely offers a good illustration. Mawker is inhabited by people who bear either 
Khasi-sounding or Karbi-sounding surnames; but these patronyms also coexist in 
many households. Actually, this is not only the result of a few occasional inter-ethnic 
marriages and of ‘acculturation’. A look at the genealogical structure of Mawker’s 
households gives the impression that all kinds of arrangements are possible.  35 
Patrilineal and matrilineal forms coexist within the very same houses, and matrilineal 
descent is combined with either matrilocality, patrilocality, or neolocality. Neither the 
Khasiness nor the Karbiness of surnames seems to be in any correlation with the 
descent practices. Most of Mawker’s 58 households throw into question the 
matrilineality of the Khasi, the patrilineality of the Karbi, and the structural coherence 
of descent systems. Of course, many good justifications (economy, pluri-ethnicity …) 
could be found to explain the particular choices and arrangements made in each 
house. But the points to be stressed here are both the great flexibility in these 
choices and their association with a loose ethnic and even clanic identity. Mawker’s 
people speak Khasi and Karbi, have Khasi or Karbi surnames, follow both matrilineal 
34 During Yangli, seven main villages sacrifice to the goddess Lukhmi in the name of their dependent 
hamlets (pham). The summation of the phams of a village does not form a continuous space, which 
suggests that ritual links are maintained subsequent to migrations.
35 Data discussed here emanates from the electoral lists of Meghalaya.
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and patrilineal descent, and have some difficulties in answering the question: “Which 
ethnic group do you belong to?”
Non-ethnic Polities, Trans-ethnic Clans and the Modern Ethnic States
We can presume that ‘loose’ or ‘undefined’ identities have something to do with cross 
belongings; but in which way? One possible conjecture would be that those cultural 
minorities are placed in an ambiguous situation owing to their insertion into a Khasi 
polity and a Khasi demographical majority. In the present ethnic context of Northeast 
India, identities tend to be exclusive. This may make certain minorities feel uneasy, 
as they are somehow compelled to choose only one among their several ethnic 
belongings. Thus, putting forward a clanic rather than an ethnic belonging, in the way 
our Mawker informants did, would be a way out of an alternative between, for 
example, Karbi and Khasi. Against this perfectly defensible interpretation, I would 
suggest another one that understands such identity statements in a literal manner, as 
expressing the possibility of non-ethnic identities. Pending more data on the history 
of these ‘marginal’ groups, I would put forward the following hypothesis: rather than a 
conflicting situation, the identity expressed by the marginal groups of Ri-Bhoi is a 
vestige of an ancient identity pattern in which clanic belonging did not determined 
ethnic or tribal belonging. This would account for the existence of similar clan names 
among the present distinct ethnic groups. An analogous phenomenon has been 
unearthed by Günther Schlee in East Africa.36 Trans-ethnic descents, or at least 
homonymies, should make us constantly interrogate the perennial validity of ethnic 
belongings versus clanic belongings. The classical approach to tribal societies in 
anthropology starts from the ethnic group and then introduces the clans as sub-units. 
This correctly reflects the indigenous discourses, which – putting our atypical cases 
aside – describe the clans has having stemmed from the primordial ancestor of the 
tribe, and seldom evoke the existence of a parent tribe. But though this segmentary 
process is historically plausible, it does not rule out the possibility of another one, in 
which the clans would be relatively permanent entities, blending to form new ethnic 
36 Schlee (1985) elaborately described the segmentation of a proto-group into different ethnicities that 
retained the original descent units. Concerning Northeast India at least, I think that this is not 
incompatible with the possibility of an opposite movement, i.e. a process of aggregation where clans 
regularly combine to form new ethnic groups.
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groups, moving individually from one group to another or simply surviving without any 
ethnic affiliation.
I do not mean that ascribed or self-ascribed ethnic identities did not exist in the 
past. We have seen above some occurrences of what looked like ethnic categories in 
Assamese historical documents. What might be challenged is the idea that ethnic 
identity necessarily relied on descent, as has become the dominant trend today. 
Neither is it obvious that culture, including language, formed prime belongings, i.e. 
those that were primarily asserted in identity. Some living clues are available today, 
for instance in the dual cultural morphology of the Tiwa, and more generally in the 
cultural heterogeneity of Northeastern groups.37 Present- day Plains Tiwa and Hills 
Tiwa speak languages of distinct families (Indo-Aryan/Tibeto-Burmese), follow 
antithetic descent rules (patrilinear/matrilinear), and bear altogether different 
patronyms. They nevertheless constitute a single ethnic entity in the sense that most 
of them not only claim to be Tiwa but recognized the same quality in the members of 
the other cultural sub-group (Hills/Plains).
The Tiwa identity, as well as the atypical identities of the non-Khasi speakers 
living in Khasi polities, allow us to imagine what could have been the importance of 
political and territorial belongings in the genesis of present identities. Because what 
brings together Plains and Hills Tiwa, in the last instance, beyond their present ethnic 
identity, is their common recognition of the Gobhā deorājā, whose – now solely ritual – 
authority was and is exerted both on the hills- and plains-dwellers irrespective of their 
clans, descent rules, or languages.38 The present Tiwa identity would be a projection 
of their former political belonging. The position of cultural continuities and 
discontinuities within this ancient identity set-up founded on clans and political 
entities remains to be understood. Did submission to a chief result in the adoption of 
politically dominant clans’ culture? Or did the system allow for the co-existence of 
37 More than the Karbi, the Naga case is emblematic: Naga identity may be recent, the ‘Naga’ label 
may have been ascribed from outside; nevertheless, the extreme diversity of languages and social 
structures does not prevent a large number of individuals claiming this label. On the Naga’s linguistic 
diversity, see van Driem 1997; on political systems, Bouchery 2007. 
38 For a brief introduction on the Tiwa king, see Ramirez 2007: 104–5.
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several linguistic groups as well as various religious practices, provided, for instance, 
that certain rituals were attended and certain taxes were paid?
Among the elements involved in the formation of current identities in the 
region, political belonging, i.e. either belonging to a polity or acknowledgment of a 
ruler, remains crucial. Compared to the situation in the colonial period, the nature of 
political belonging has obviously evolved. The major innovation has been, it seems, 
the territory, or rather, the spatialization of authority. The present administrative 
arrangements, shaped according to the modern state model, rely on continuous 
spaces bounded by linear borders. This is the case of states and districts in the 
Northeast and has made conflicts between Northeastern states a regular occurrence. 
These concern both the delimitation of borders and the closely related issue of 
border populations’ citizenship. Since the creation of Meghalaya, regular crises have 
opposed Meghalaya’s and Assam’s public opinions on the issue of the harassment of 
‘Block I & II Khasi’ living on the Assamese side of the border in the Karbi-dominated 
district of Karbi-Anglong. As a result, Karbi living in Meghalaya have been regularly 
given a ‘notice to leave’ by certain Khasi organizations. Such reactions may be seen 
as the direct effect of the new dominant ethnic model, which ‘ethnicized’ spaces by 
assigning exclusive rights over a continuous space to a single ethnic group. Karbi-
Anglong tends to be viewed, by both sides, as a ‘Karbiland’, and Eastern Meghalaya 
as a ‘Khasiland’. Thus dominant ethnicized groups prove to have a dual attitude 
towards the marginal ‘loosely ethnicized’ groups like those of eastern Ri-Bhoi: either 
they underplay differences and specificities or these are acknowledged, and in the 
latter case this may lead them to the conclusion that these communities are not 
geographically in their correct place. This is far from being as yet a dominant 
paradigm in the hills, where, beyond the chattering classes, inter-community 
relationships are still largely regulated by what I’ve called the ‘ancient identity model’. 
We hope to have shown how the study of ‘uncertain ethnic identities’ helps 
greatly in understanding how ethnic identities themselves may have emerged, how 
they are not ‘necessary’, how they are evolving, and more simply what are their basic 
paradigms. To this end, the concept of belonging is quite useful in qualifying the 
individual bricks out of which collective identities are built. Ethnic identity appears to 
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have emerged as a crystallization of intersecting clanic, spatial, territorial, political, 
and religious belongings. In each case, a different set of belongings has come 
forward to sustain the materiality of the emergent ethnic group: descent groups, 
surnames communities, polities, and geographical areas seem definitely to have 
been crucial in the past; but belonging to linguistic, religious (especially Christian), or 
proto-ethnic communities (‘Mongoloïd’, ‘Tibeto-Burmese’...) assumes a growing 
role.39 Ethnicities appear as layers of a new type that are superimposed above pre-
existing belongings; not yet completely, however, and on the margins several 
pockets of – in ethnic terms – loose identities remain. Further research may reveal 
whether they are relics, having escaped the ethnicization processes, or in the 
contrary, paradoxical outcomes of conflicting ethnic forces. In the second case, it 
might not be entirely inaccurate to imagine that such marginal and atypical patterns 
may inspire new forms of identities in the future. Identity and belongings are clearly 
related in a dialectical way, mutually shaping each other. But the steadiness of the 
cultural and social frameworks that determine belongings definitely sets some limits 
to the imposition of invented ethnic communities. At the borders, uncertain identities 
always tend to appear. 
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